[bubble.tea]

Anyone here use it?

My dad is currently overthere, and he's suffering with a SE T230. In a couple weeks, he'll receive a black razor that I just bought for him. Hopefully it'll work fine.

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› See More: Iraqna

[jeaniesing]

prayers for dad ... and you are some cool son!

[bubble.tea]

prayers for dad ... and you are some cool son!

wow...thanks, much appreciated. His company has the highest safety standards, and best track records, so there's some relief there...allbeit nothing's guaranteed. He is always recounting hearing detonations/bombings etc.

me cool...awwwwwwwwww shucks

p.s. OOH OH OH., I see you have the E815. very sweeeeeeeeeeet. we should chit chat., pm me yer hotmail.

[bubble.tea]

a good read
http://weblog.warpspeed.com/2005/08/30.html

Actually I realized, he's actually one of the "officials" who is using MCI with a NY 914 area code (I can call him on his cellie and office phone like it's a US call ) so he's not really using iraqna...rather MCI...but anyways.

Iraq Wireless
Date: July 21, 2005 4:09:49 AM PDT
To: "Dewayne-Net Technology List" <[email protected]>;
Subject: [Dewayne-Net] Iraq Wireless

[Note: This item comes from reader Mike Cheponis. DLH]

From: Mike Cheponis <[email protected]>;
Date: July 21, 2005 12:05:53 AM PDT
To: Dewayne Hendricks <[email protected]>;
Subject: iraq wireless

WSJ excerpt:

`Wireless technology has made insurgent groups much more effective. For example, a mortar-firing team miles away from its target can adjust its aim via cellphone contact with a spotter, who can see exactly where mortar shells have landed.'

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Iraq's Cellphone Battle Service Provider Iraqna Tries To Meet Demand Despite Long Outages, Insurgent Use

By YAROSLAV TROFIMOV and SARMAD ALI

BAGHDAD, Iraq -- A video sold in Baghdad market stalls these days shows young insurgents firing a series of mortars and calling for the American infidels to be expelled. To adjust their aim, the militants rely on a gadget that owes its appearance in Iraq to the 2003 U.S. invasion -- the cellphone.

Saddam Hussein outlawed cellphones, determined to maintain an iron grip on his subjects. But as Iraq catches up with the world's information revolution, cellphones have become as commonplace here as they are almost everywhere else in the world. Now, they are increasingly being used as battle tools -- to set off bombs from afar, to target fire and to provide insurgents with instant communications.

Caught in the middle of the conflict raging between the insurgents and U.S. and Iraqi forces is the company responsible for bringing commercial mobile-phone service to Baghdad: Iraqna. With its catchy yellow Q emblazoned on hundreds of Baghdad storefronts, Iraqna, a unit of Egyptian communications conglomerate Orascom Telecom Holding SAE was supposed to be the symbol of free enterprise in a new Iraq. But the tribulations of Iraqna (pronounced ee-RAQ-na) since its launch in late 2003 underscore the difficulty of doing business in a nation at war, where the freedom of wireless communication often hits head-on the needs of security.

Almost half of Iraqna's 300 power generators -- a necessity in Iraqi cities, because blackouts are still a daily occurrence -- have been stolen. Three communication sites were destroyed by bombs. Late last year, insurgents kidnapped two Iraqna engineers, expatriates from Egypt, and accused them of collaborating with the U.S. Then, Iraqi security services raided Iraqna headquarters and briefly detained the company's head of security, accusing him of colluding with the insurgents.

"We're between the two fires, operating in the most dangerous spot in the world," says Shamel Hanafi, Iraqna's chief commercial officer, who was the company's first employee on the ground here and now co-manages the network. He sits in the company's bunker-like office, protected against suicide bombers by concrete blast walls and dozens of Kalashnikov-toting gunmen employed by Iraqna. Some insurgents had accused Iraqna of helping security forces spy on their activities -- a charge Iraqna denies, saying it deliberately opted not to install equipment in the communications network that would have allowed it to track and store users' movements.

Despite pouring more than $180 million into Iraq, making it one of the largest private foreign investors here, Iraqna has had trouble assuring regular service in Baghdad. Late last year and throughout the first half of 2005 its network was plagued by frequent outages that sometimes lasted hours or days, causing widespread resentment. "All the Iraqis know that this is the worst provider in the whole world. You can't contact anyone at any time," grumbles Muthanna Anis, a vendor of cellphone accessories.

Bombarded with complaints, Iraqna officials have pointed their fingers in one direction: the U.S. All along, U.S. forces here have been using jamming devices to disrupt enemy communications during security raids and to neutralize cellphones attached to bombs that may be waiting along the road when a convoy passes. When called, these phones work as detonators, making the bombs explode.

In Baghdad, fear of cellphones is so widespread that U.S. and Iraqi security guards routinely order civilians to remove the batteries from their phones before approaching checkpoints. Wireless technology has made insurgent groups much more effective. For example, a mortar-firing team miles away from its target can adjust its aim via cellphone contact with a spotter, who can see exactly where mortar shells have landed.

Iraqna has 1.1 million subscribers, up from 537,000 at the end of 2004 -- the increase came after the company expanded in Iraq's southern region, said Jonas Lindblad, a Middle East senior analyst for Pyramid Research, a communications consulting firm in Cambridge, Mass. When service was first offered in Iraq after the war, subscribers paid a one-time fee of $69 and calling cards were sold in denominations of $20 or $30. Now, starting Iraqna service costs $17.50, and calling cards are as cheap as $10. Rates vary from six to 12 cents per minute.

Cellphones, despite Iraqna's problems, still often provide more reliable communications than the fixed-line phone network, which was badly damaged in Baghdad by American bombing and subsequent looting in 2003. Most Iraqi cellphone users have prepaid cards that they can continually replenish.

U.S. military officials acknowledge that occasional jamming occurs but deny that they systematically disrupt Iraqi communications networks. Iraqna officials disagree, alleging that American interference reached such massive proportions in recent months that it frequently knocked out their entire system.

"We understand the circumstances here, and we can accept some interference three or four hours a day -- but not around the clock, 24 hours," says Mr. Hanafi. "The customers don't understand. They think it's our mistake. People come here and complain, saying we stole their money, we're crooks."

Most U.S. officials in Baghdad, and select Iraqis, rely on a separate, restricted cellphone network managed by MCI Inc. that uses the 914 area code of New York's Westchester County. Another mobile-phone competitor, Atheer Telecom, a company part-owned by Britain's Vodafone Group PLC, has been expanding into Baghdad in recent months, poaching clients unhappy with Iraqna's performance.

Iraq's cellular licenses, issued when the nation was governed by the U.S. occupation authority in 2003, divided the country into three monopoly areas, initially restricting Iraqna to Baghdad and central Iraq, cellphone company Asiacell to the northern part, and Atheer to southern regions. These limits were lifted last year, allowing competition. The three licenses expire at the end of 2005; authorities plan a conference in London starting today to discuss possible renewal.

Iraqna has repeatedly taken jamming complaints to the Iraqi government's telecommunications ministry, urging it to intercede with the U.S. military and to confirm for irate clients that such interference does indeed go on. Nasi Abachi, the ministry's head of frequency management, says he and his team have responded to several Iraqna tip-offs in recent months.

On at least one occasion, he says, the Iraqi investigators discovered a "clone" broadcast tower operating in central Baghdad that falsely identified itself as part of the Iraqna network. The result of such "intelligent jamming" was that all the phones in the area tried to abandon the real antenna and switch to the clone, causing a network overload and a massive disruption of service.

Investigators have no proof that U.S. forces operated the clone antenna, but no one else in Iraq is believed to have the technical capability to do so. "We have good reason to believe that what Iraqna is saying is right," Mr. Abachi says.

Despite the problems, Iraqna is pushing ahead to gain new business. It is targeting Iraq's southern region because it's heavily populated, with roughly nine million people, and has a more stable security environment than Baghdad. Like the incumbents and several potential newcomers, Iraqna plans to compete for the new Iraq mobile licenses.

Plus, Iraqna's increasingly public complaints seem to have had some effect. While jamming still occurs, it has been causing "much less impact on the network" in recent weeks, says Iraqna's Mr. Hanafi.